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ABSTRACT 
A goal in approximate r asoning is the querying of fuzzy knowledge bases. This 
can be viewed as the estimation of the modalities of a proposition on the basis of 
vague propositions that can even be only partially true, partially necessary, or 
partially possible. In this article, we present aframework for an integrated theory of 
imprecision and uncertainty. First, we describe a tool to transform a proposition 
qualified by a partial degree of necessity (possibility) into a fuzzier, but true, 
proposition. Second, we show that the degree of truth of a proposition estimated 
from imprecise information is not necessarily unique but belongs to an interval 
where the lower bound is a necessity measure and the upper bound is a possibility 
measure. The theory of multiple-valued truths thus finds an interpretation in this 
integrated theory of uncertainty and imprecision. 
KEYWORDS:  approximate reasoning, knowledge-based systems, possibil- 
ity theory, fuzzy sets theory, multiple-valued truths 
INTRODUCTION 
In commonsense reasoning, two types of ignorance that lead to different 
models can be distinguished. First, when information is certain but imprecise, 
one can use modalities (necessity and possibility) and multiple-valued truths. 
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Second, when information is uncertain in that it conveys the idea that something 
may occur, that it is probable, that we can believe in it . . . . .  one can use 
classical theories of uncertainty such as probability theory, Shafer's theory of 
evidence [1], and Sugeno's measures [2]. 
The first type of ignorance will be qualified as an epistemic ignorance as it 
deals with the determination f the truth status of some proposition given other 
propositions contained in our "knowledge base" and known to be true, even 
though they may be imprecise. Epistemic ignorance corresponds to the 
conformity obtained by a semantical matching between the meaning of a 
proposition and the reality as known. Imprecision, be it due to vagueness or not, 
induces epistemic ignorance. When the truth status of a proposition is binary, 
either true or false, epistemic ignorance reduces itself to that part of classical 
logic where one tries to deduce the truth status of a proposition given a set of true 
propositions, and to classical modal logic when one tries to evaluate the 
necessity or the possibility of a proposition. This paper generalizes this approach 
when one accepts that the truth status, the necessity, and the possibility of 
propositions can admit degrees and can be defined on a bounded ordered interval 
such as the [0, 1] interval. Partial truth is admitted and is essentially related to 
the use of vague predicates (a justification of its existence and a method for its 
evaluation can be found in Smets and Magrez [3, 4]). 
Example I A proposition such as "Paul is young" will be qualified as true 
if we know that Paul's age is 15 but only possible if we know that Paul's age 
belongs to the interval 7-77 years. 
The second kind of ignorance is the uncertainty representing our opinion, our 
judgment about the truth of a proposition. Supra-epistemic ignorance fits the 
concepts of probability, credibility, plausibility . . . . .  It is called supra-epistemic 
because it covers a type of ignorance mbedded in a metalanguage that can be 
constructed above the language including, among other things, epistemic 
ignorance, hence the "supra" qualification. 
This paper deals only with epistemic ignorance. Its aim is to find a link 
between the definition of imprecision in fuzzy set theory and the definition of 
ignorance in modal ogic and multiple-valued logics, a link that could bridge the 
gap between imprecision and epistemic ignorance in a general way. This link 
will be important in solving various problems. For example, let an expert system 
reasoning process yield the information: "the truth that Paul is young is .8." 
From this information stored in the knowledge base, the expert system must be 
able to evaluate, by some kind of approximate matching, the truth of such 
propositions as: "Paul's age belongs to [25, 35]," "Paul is not very young," 
.... As we will see, the resolution of this problem will be possible when the 
stored proposition can be transformed into a strictly true, but maybe fuzzier, 
proposition. 
This paper presents the following points. First, we define a method to 
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transform a partially necessary (or possible) proposition into a necessary, but 
eventually fuzzier and thus less precise, proposition. In other words, it becomes 
possible to take away any modal predicate and therefore to perform computa- 
tions only in the imprecise nvironment. Second, we show that this transforma- 
tion verifies the fundamental properties of necessity and possibility measures. 
Third, an interpretation of partial truth is proposed by reference to the two 
previous points. In the same way, we define how the partial truth predicate can 
be removed from a proposition to yield a strictly true, but less precise, 
proposition. Classical properties of the truth measures are shown to be also 
satisfied. 
NECESSITY AND POSSIBILITY 
Many propositions can be expressed in the form "X  is A"  [5-7]. The 
predicate A restricts the possible values of the variable X on a universe of 
discourse ~. This restriction is induced by the membership function of the subset 
of fl represented by the meaning of A. 
Example 2 The proposition "Paul is young" can be translated into "Paul's 
age is YOUNG." The predicate YOUNG acts as an elastic constraint on the 
acceptable values for the variable X (Paul's age) in the universe fl of all possible 
ages. For each x E fl, one can define #YOUNG(X) E [0, 1] as the grade of 
membership ofthe age x in the set YOUNG; that is, as the grade of membership 
of someone whose age is x in the set of young men. 
The grade of membership #A (X) is alSO interpreted by Zadeh as the degree of 
possibility, ~'A (x), that the proposition p = "X  takes the value x"  is true, 
knowing that "X  is A . "  We have the equivalence Vx E fl: /zA(X) = 7rA(X), 
where ~rA: fl ~ [0, 1] is the so-called possibility distribution defined by the 
predicate A on the universe ft. 
Let us suppose now that one has two predicates A and B on the same universe. 
Given the true proposition "X  is B , "  what is the possibility, or the necessity, 
that the proposition "X  is A"  is true? 
DEFINITION 1 Let A and B be two predicates defined on a universe ft. 
Knowing that "X  is B'" is true, the degree of possibility that the 
proposition "'X is A "" is true, FI(A I B), is given by [5] 
I I(A [B)=Sup Min(~rA(x), rB(x)) (1) 
xEf l  
where ~r A (x) is the possibility distribution defined by the predicate A on 
the universe fl and lrB(x) is the possibility distribution defined by the 
predicate B on the universe ft. 
As in modal ogic, one has a dual relation between ecessity and possibility: 
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the necessity is the complement of the possibility of the complement. Let 
N(A I B) be the degree of necessity that "X  is A"  is true given that the 
proposition "X  is B"  is true. The duality implies the following definition: 
N(A [B)= 1 -l-I('-, A [B) (2) 
NOTE 1 We will write "the possibility (necessity) of A (given B)"  for "the 
degree of possibility (necessity) that "X  is A"  is true (given that he proposition 
"X  is B"  is true)." Furthermore, we use the same symbol "A"  for a predicate 
and for the proposition "X  is A"  where predicate A def'mes a restriction on a 
universe fl (where X is the variable describing the elements of f~). Therefore, if 
fl represents all the possible ages, A is the predicate YOUNG, "X  is A"  
signifies "Paul's age is YOUNG" (i.e., Paul is young), and proposition A is the 
proposition "X  is A , "  where X stands for Paul's age. 
D~.Ftr~mON 2 Let A and B be two predicates defined on a universe ft. 
Knowing that "'X is B'" is true, the necessity that the proposition "'X is 
A "" is true, N(AIB) ,  is given by 
N(A  ]B)=Inf  MaX(rA(X), 1 -- its(x)) (3) 
xEfl 
These definitions are generalized by the use of triangular norms (Sanchez [8]): 
II(A [B)=Sup ® (a'A(X), rB(X)) (4) 
and 
N(A IB)=In f  • (rA(x), 1-rB(x))  (5) 
xEfl 
where @ is a T-norm and • is the corresponding T-conorm (see appendix). 
Example 3 Let the proposition B: "Paul's age is around 24, 25" be present 
in the knowledge base. Let a second proposition A: "Paul is young" be matched 
by the inference ngine with proposition B. Propositions A and B each induce a 
possibility distribution on the universe fl of all possible ages. Suppose the 
appropriate T-norm is the Tm T-norm (Tin), with the bounded sum (BS) its 
corresponding T-conorm (this choice will be argued below). The possibility of 
"Paul's age is young," knowing "Paul's age is around 24, 25," is given by 
(Figure 1): 
II(A I B) = Sup Tm(r A (x), IrB(X)) = .73 
xEfl 
The necessity to have "Paul's age is young," knowing "Paul's age is around 
24, 25," is 
N(A [B) =Inf  BS (~rA(x), 1 - rB(x))= .67 
xEfl  
Fuzzy Knowledge-Based Systems 39 
1"I 
1°t A B 
! 
20 25 30 35 
Figure 1. Modalities estimation for the proposition A: 'Paul is young' knowing that 
proposition B: 'Paul' age is around 24, 25' is true. 
PARENT D ISTR IBUT IONS 
We have defined the way to compute the modalities (necessity and possibility) 
of a proposition from the knowledge of a strictly true proposition. Now the 
opposite way must be considered: How do we compute a strictly true proposition 
B from a proposition A qualified by a modality? The problem is: Given that 
N("X  is A" )  = ~ [or that YI("X is A" )  = f ] ,  what is the proposition B such 
that N("X  is B")  = I I ( "X is B")  = 1? This kind of transformation will create 
a proposition B on which no uncertainty remains, a proposition B necessarily 
and possibly true but eventually fuzzier than proposition A. This unknown 
proposition B will be called the parent proposition. Dubois and Prade [9] have 
recently proposed another way to estimate a parent distribution by using Shafer's 
evidence theory. 
DEFINrnON 3 A parent proposition is a strictly true proposition induced 
by a set of  propositions whose modalities are known, and from which 
these modalities would have been deduced if this parent proposition had 
been initially known (i.e., present in the knowledge base). 
Let the proposition B be an estimation of the parent proposition that has 
implied a modal qualified proposition A. This estimation has a practical 
application in the field of knowledge-based systems. Suppose we want to 
compute the modalities of a proposition C on the basis of the partial information 
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that there is a necessity O that "X  is A" :  
N("x  is C"  I N("x  is A ") = O) = ? 
For example, what is the necessity of "Paul's age is young," knowing that the 
necessity that "Paul's age is around 24, 25" equals .8? To answer this, we have 
to use Eq. (5). But in that equation, the conditioning proposition B is strictly true 
and not a partially necessarily true proposition. Thus, we first have to estimate 
such a strictly true, but unknown, B given that N("X  is A" )  = O. 
Parent Distribution Based on a Necessity Measure 
From the information "the necessity of A equals 0,"  two facts can be 
inferred: 
1. The predicate A restricts the possible values of X; that is, it induces a 
possibility distribution lra (X) on ft. 
2. This distribution ~'A may be partially necessary, as 0 belongs to [0, 1]. 
From Eqs. (2) and (4), we have, for any B; 
N(A [B)= 1 -I-I("1 A IB ) = 1 -Sup  @ (1 -*rA(X), 7rB(X)) 
xE  fl 
(with @ a T-norm). 
We want a B such that N(A IB)  = O. We obtain 
1 - Sup ® (I - rA (X), a'B(X)) = O 
xEtl  
Thus 
Sup @ (1 - 7rA(x), 7ra(x)) = 1 - 0 (6) 
xEfi 
The possibility distribution a'n must be such that the supremum of its 
intersection with the complement of the distribution ira gives the scalar 1 - O. 
In general, (6) does not yield to a unique solution for *rn hut to a family of 
acceptable distributions ~rB. Let ~ be the family of acceptable predicates B such 
that a'B satisfies (6). ~ is a lattice with an order relation _< *. One.says that B _< * 
B '  if *rn(x) < *rB, (X), qX E ft. In that case, B '  is not smaller than B, and 
reciprocally B is not larger than B ' .  The unique upper B* and lower B .  
solutions will be defined such that for all B E ~, B ,  < * B < * B*. 
Upper Solution 
THEOREM 1 The upper solution B* which is the largest element in ~, is 
given by 
rB.(X)=Sup{u: u E [0, 1], ®(1-~ 'a (x ) ,  u ) -< l -O} (7) 
with ® the T-norm of  (6). 
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Proof The proof that (7) is the unique upper solution for Eq. (6) was already 
made for the resolution of composite fuzzy relations (see Sanchez [8]). [] 
B* is the less specific, less informative solution because it restricts the least 
the possible values on ft. The degree of possibility of each singleton x defined by 
the predicate B* equals the greatest value u such that its conjunction (based on 
@) with 1 - irA(x) remains less than or equal to 1 - O. In other words, B* 
corresponds tothe largest predicate for which its conjunction with -~ A is always 
___1-0.  
For some classical T-norms, solutions are 
1 if 7rA(X)>-O 
® =Min: 7rn,(x)= 1 -0  if a'A(X)<O (8) 
I{ (1  -O)/[1 - a'A(X)]} A 1 (9) 
= product: 7rB,(X) = 1 if 7rA (X) = 1 
= Tin: 7rB,(X)= 1 A [~ra(X) + 1 --O] (10) 
7rn,(X) = [1- -O if rA(X)=0 (11) ®=Tw:  1 otherwise 
The structure of B* depends on the T-norm used in (6). Whenever the 
proposition "X  is A"  is in the knowledge base, the proposition is not only true, 
but necessarily true. It seems natural to further impose the requirement that if 
one asks about N("X  is A") ,  the inference ngine should answer N("X  is A" )  
= 1. If we know that "Paul is young" [N("Paul is young") = 1] and someone 
asks our knowledge base about the status of the same proposition "Paul is 
young," there is no reason to consider it less necessarily true. Therefore one 
needs N(A IA  ) = 1. 
Axiom 1 Whenever the set defined by the predicate A corresponds to the 
set defined by the predicate B, the proposition "'X is A "" given that "'X is 
B'" is necessarily true. 
(Vx E f~, rA(X)=1rB(X)) = N(A IB)=I  
TrIF.O~M 2 The only continuous T-norm in the equation [Eq. (7)] 
verifying Axiom 1 is the Tm T-norm. 
Proof. 
N(A  IA)= 1 -Sup  ® (1 - XA(X), rA(X))= 1 
xE  t~ 
This equation is true iff 
Sup @ (1--~rA(x), ~A(X))=O (*) 
xEt' l  
Property (*) is the law of noncontradiction (A A ~A = ~).  Trillas et al. [I0] 
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proved that for the classical strong negation; c(a) = 1 - a, the only continuous 
T-norm satisfying this property is the Tm T-norm. Note that the T~, yields to 
N(A I A) = 1 but is not continuous. This noncontinuity gives contra-intuitive 
results uch as yielding to a crisp proposition B* by the use of N(A) = 1, with 
A a fuzzy proposition. [] 
This estimation of B* is useful because it allows us to transform a partially 
uncertain proposition into a certain proposition--a less specific proposition, of 
course. Moreover, one can now estimate the necessity (and the possibility) that a 
proposition is true given a partially uncertain proposition. Knowing that N(A) 
= O, we compute the largest B* such that N(A IB*) = O. Then we estimate 
N(C]N(A ) = 8) = N(CI B*) = f, where N(C  I B*) is computed by (5) with a 
bounded-sum T-conorm. This ability to perform estimation of modalities from a 
knowledge base containing epistemically uncertain propositions i fundamental, 
especially for fuzzy expert systems, which usually contain in their working 
memory some facts partially necessary, such as those inferred by fuzzy modus 
ponens. 
Example 4 Let a partially necessary proposition A = "Paul's age is around 
24, 25" exist in a knowledge base with N(A) = .8. The moralities of other 
propositions have to be evaluated taking this information into account. For 
example, we could ask the expert system about he status of a proposition C = 
"Paul is young." Therefore, the problem is 
N("Paul is young" IN("Paul's age is around 24, 25")= .8)= ? 
H("Paul is young" IN("Paul's age is around 24, 25")= .8)= ? 
The first step of the resolution is to estimate the unknown parent distribution B* 
by Eq. (10). We have ~rB.(x) = 1 ^  [~rA(x) + .2] (Figure 2). The second step is 
to estimate moralities for the proposition C from the information B* using Eqs. 
(4) and (5) with the Tm T-norm and the corresponding bounded-sum T-conorm: 
N(CIB*) = .61 and I-I(CIB*) = .79. In other words, we can conclude 
N(CIN(A)= .8)= .61 and I I(CIN(A)= .8)= .79 
LOWER SOLUTION Even though the upper solution B* seems the only natural 
choice, it might be formally interesting to evaluate the lower solution B , ,  the 
most precise, most informative solution, the one that gives the lowest possibility 
to each dement of its domain. As a consequence, this solution gives the greatest 
necessity to any subset of its domain. Its unnaturalness is due to the fact that it 
makes subsets more necessary than they are. The upper solution B* is natural 
because it keeps the level of necessity of any subset as small as possible. 
THEOREM 3 The lower solution B,  for the parent distribution induced by 
the information "'N(A) = O,'" with a normalized istribution A [Sup 
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Figure 2. Modalities estimation for the proposition C: 'Paul is young' knowing that he 
necessity of the proposition A: 'Paul' age is around 24, 25' to be true is 0.8. 
ira(x) = 1], is given by 
I1  if 7rA (X) = a 
~rB.(X) = 0 otherwise. (12) 
The normalization will be required to verify the classical properties of the 
necessity and possibility measures (see below). 
Proof. One can obtain it by solving 
Vx 6 fl: a'B(x)=inf{u: u 6 [0, 1], ®(1--a'A(X), U)_<l--a} 
and 
3x E X: ®(1-~'A(x),  "XB(X))=I--O [] 
NOTE 2 The solution is independent on the choice of the T-norm, thanks to the 
limit property of T-norms: V®: ®(a, 1) = a. 
NOTE 3 The number of singletons x that define the set B ,  depends on the shape 
of the original distribution A. For example, if A is a convex fuzzy set, one or 
two singletons are plausible lower solutions whenever Obelongs to ]0, 1 [ (Figure 
3). More than two singletons is a possible solution for B ,  when the set A is 
nonconvex (Figure 3) or when the convex set contains a step. 
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Figure 3. Number of Singletons for the set B depending on the shape of A induced by 
the information N(A ) = a. 
Therefore, the practical interest of the lower solution is weak. In fact, this 
solution is often not unique and depends on the shape of the distribution. In 
addition, it is the more informative and strongest solution, and thus the less 
judicious choice. 
Example 5 By using Example 4, we estimate the modalities of C with the 
lower solution B, .  The set B ,  is given by 
I I if 7rA(X)= .8 
• "B.(X) = 0, otherwise 
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The distribution B ,  is represented by two singletons: 23.2 and 25.8 years 
(Figure 4). 
Parent Distribution Induced by a Possibility Measure 
Sometimes proposition A can be qualified by a possibility measure instead of 
a necessity measure. We would like to infer the parent proposition from the 
information H(A ) -- 0. The finding of the solution is straightforward thanks to 
the dual relation between the measures of necessity and possibility: N(A)  = 1 
- H(-~ A). We only have to consider the solution for B induced by N(--1A ) = 
1 -0 .  
THEOREM 4 The upper solution B* for  the parent distribution obtained 
from the information "TI(A) = 0"" is given by 
7rs,(x)= 1 A (1 -TrA(x)+0) (13) 
THEOREM 5 The lower solution B ,  for  the parent distribution obtained 
from the information "TI(A ) = O, "" with a normalized istribution A 
[Sup 7rA (x) = 1], is given by 
I if lrA (X) = 0 
~rs.(x) = 0 otherwise (14) 
Note that the lower solution obtained from the information " I I (A)  = O" is 
equal to the lower solution (12) obtained from the information "N(A  ) = O." 
This property will be highlighted below. 
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Figure 4. Estimation of the lower solution B, obtained from the information that the 
necessity of the proposition A: 'Paul' age is around 24, 25' to be true is 0.8. 
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Parent Distribution Induced by Necessity and Possibility Measures 
When partial necessity and partial possibility measures qualify a proposition 
A, we would like to estimate a unique parent distribution B such that 
N(A IB)=a and 1-I(A IB)=f (a_<f) 
These two requirements allow us to define independently wo upper solutions, 
respectively B* and B~'. One may postulate that, given both requirements, the 
general upper solution is obtained by the conjunction of these two solutions. The 
conjunction will be performed by the use of the only idempotent T-norm, the 
minimum. Indeed, when B* = B*, it seems natural to require that the 
conjunction should be equal to them. 
THEOREM 6 The upper solution B* for the parent distribution obtained 
from the information "'N(A) = 0 and H(A) = f '"  is given by 
Vx E t :  rB.(X)=(rA(X)+ 1--O) A (1- - rA(x)+f)  (15) 
Proof Upper solutions are obtained by the elementary estimations. 
N(A)=O gives: lrBT(X)=(TrA(X)+ 1--0) A 1 
I I (A)=fgives:  rBi(X)=(1-- ra (x )+f )  A 1 [] 
THEOREM 7 The lower solution for the parent distribution B ,  obtained 
from the information "'N(A) = 0 and II(A) = f '"  is a disjunction of  n 
singletons: 
(1  if 7rA(x)= 0 orTrA(X)=f 
VX E t :  7rB.(X)= ~0 otherwise (16) 
PROPERTIES OF NECESSITY AND POSSIBILITY MEASURES 
This particular way to transform an uncertain proposition into an imprecise 
proposition must keep intact he properties of the modalities. The fundamental 
property for necessity measures 
N(P  & Q) =N(P)  A N(Q)  (17) 
Let us remember first the definition of noninteractivity. Two variables X and 
Y that take their values on fll and 02, respectively, and whose possibility 
distributions are *rx and r r  are said to be noninteractive if their joint possibility 
distribution ~rx.r from Q1 x 02 to [0, 1] is defined by the Min operator: 
V(X, y)  E fll X02: 7rx, r(X, y)=Min(rx(X), rr(Y)) (18) 
where lrx and lr~. are the marginal possibility distributions. As pointed by Zadeh 
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[11-13], noninteractivity in possibility theory plays a role analogous to that of 
independence in probability theory. 
THEOREM 8 Let X and Y be two noninteractive variables that take their 
values on fh and f12, respectively. Assume two propositions P = "'X is P'" 
and Q = "'Y is Q'" with necessities N(P)  = O, N(Q)  = f. Let P'  and Q' 
be their corresponding necessarily true fuzzy propositions obtained by the 
use of  the upper solution (10). Then, the necessity to have P & Q when we 
have P'  & Q' equals the minimum of O and f. 
N(P & QIP' & Q')=O A f (19) 
where ^  denotes the minimum operator. 
This theorem means that 
N(P  & QIP'  & Q')=N(PlP') ^  N(QI Q') (20) 
We have to show that 
N(P & QIP' & Q' )= 1 -Sup[~ 0rp(x) & ~rO(y)).ASD.(lrp,(x) & ~rO,(y))] 
xy 
The operator of conjunction .AND. is more complex than a simple T-norm. In 
fact, this operator must perform the intersection of two fuzzy sets defined on a 
cartesian product fll × f12. Whenever the sets belong to the same universe (i.e., 
fll = f12), the law of noncontradicfion is verified, as we postulate that N(A IA)  
= 1. But when fll ~ f12, we can choose any T-norm to combine sets defined on 
such different universes. We decide to keep the less restrictive T-norm, the 
minimum operator, for this operation. Therefore, the structure of our operator 
.AND. must be such that the Tm operator is used for the same universe, and the 
minimum operator is used for two different universes. 
For i = 1, • •., n, let Ai and Bi be two fuzzy sets defined on a universe Ui. 
Let A and B be two complex fuzzy sets defined on the cartesian product U~ x 
U 2 X ' ' '  X U n. Then 
n 
A=AI  & A2 & "'" & An= ~Ao 
o=1 
n 
B=~Bv 
v=l  
We define the operator .AND. by 
/I 
A.AND.B= A [T,,,(Av, By)] (21) 
V=I  
Smets [14] already defined such a complex intersection, but he chose another 
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model for the T-norms. His interpretation of .AND. was made in order to 
describe the fuzzy semantics of the AND and OR connectives. Here, we are 
using the .AND. operator more in the sense of a conditional operator for some 
epistemic matching. By using the definition of .AND., Eq. (20) is valid. 
Proof of Theorem 8 N(P& QIP'  & Q')  = 1 - H(-~POR -~QIP' & 
Q').  We have 
1 - -  Sup[(Trp(x) V 1rQ(y)).AND.(ICp, (x) A lrQ, (y))] 
xy 
which must be equal to N(P[P ' )  A N(QI Q'). 
By using the property Min(a, 1) = a and the distributivity of Max, we obtain 
1 - Sup[[(7@(x) A 1).AND.0rp, (x) ^  lrQ, (y))] 
xy 
V [(1 A 7rQ(y)).AND.(Trv,(x)A ~rQ,(y))]] 
Moreover, because of the structure Max = Sup, we have 
1 -  [Sup[(~rp(x) A 1).AND.0rp,(x) A ~rQ,(y))] 
x 
V Sup[(1 A XQ(y)).AND.(Irp,(x) A lrQ,(y))]] 
Y 
By using definition (21) for .AND., the following equation holds: 
1 - [Su~(Trp(x) @ 7rp,(x)) A (1 ® 7rQ,(y))] 
x 
v Sul~(1 ® 1@,(x)) A (lrQ(y) @ rQ,(y))]] 
Y 
Since P '  and Q'  are normalized, we have 
1 -  [Sup(rp(x) @ a'p,(x)) v Sup(rQ(y) @ rQ,(y))] 
x y 
which is equal to N(P IP ' )  A N(Q IQ '  ). [] 
TrmOREM 9 Let X and Y be two noninteractive variables that take their 
values on fl~ and fie, respectively. Assume two propositions P = "'X is P "" 
and Q = "'Y is Q'" with necessities N(P)  = O, N(Q)  = f. Let P" and Q" 
be their corresponding necessarily true fuzzy propositions obtained by the 
use of  the lower solution (12). Then, the necessity to have P & Q when we 
have P'  & Q' equals the minimum of  O and f. 
N(P & QIP' & Q')=o A f 
Proof We have the equality 
N(P A QI p" A Q ' )= 1 -  [Sup(~'p(x) @ try-l(0)) V Sup0rQ(y) @ ~'Q-~(f)] 
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which yields 1 - [(1 - O) v (1 - f ) ]  by the same resolution as the previous 
proof, and which equals O A f .  [] 
In the same way, we can prove that our transformations verify the 
fundamental property of the possibility measures 
II(P Or Q) = Max(H(P), H(Q)) 
TnEOm~M 10 Let X and Y be two noninteractive ariables that take their 
values on fll and f12, respectively. Let two informations "TI(X is P) = 0"" 
and "TI( Y is Q) = f '"  be transformed in two necessarily true, fuzzy sets, 
let us say P' and Q', by the use of the upper or lower solutions (13) and 
(14). Therefore, the necessity to have P OR Q when we have P' & Q" 
equals the maximum of O and f. 
II(P Or QIP' a Q')=O v f 
Proof The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 8. [] 
NOTE 4 Zadeh [6] has empirically defined a solution for possibly qualified 
propositions. Its upper solution equals ours, but its lower solution differs: ~rs(x) 
= 0 A 7ra (x). This last solution seems to entail some problems for practical 
applications, i.e., it implies a non-normalized possibility distribution as soon as 
0~1.  
MULTIPLE-VALUED TRUTHS 
The truth of a proposition may be understood as a measure of similarity 
between its meaning and what we know of reality (Dubois and Prade [15], 
Magrez [16]). Since the conformity is not limited to a strict resemblance or a 
strict dissimilarity, some shades may appear. In these conditions, the truth value 
seems able to take different values between 0 and 1. Three-valued and multiple- 
valued logics are devoted to underlining these concepts. But, whereas the 
axiomatic was well established, a lot of problems emerged for the semantic 
interpretation of these partial truths (Rescher [17]). By using the concept of 
fuzzy sets (Zadeh [18]), and its possibilistic interpretation [6], a very natural 
semantics can be proposed. 
Semantical Interpretation of Partial Truth 
We start with a crisp proposition A for simplicity. Let v be a function from fl 
to {0, 1 } that estimates the degree of truth of an element of fl, where v (A) = 1 
means that proposition A is true and v(A)  = 0 means that proposition A is 
false. Moreover, whenever A is true (in conformity to our knowledge base) we 
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can say that A is necessarily and possibly true, I I (A) = 1 and N(A)  = 1. 
Reciprocally, if proposition A is false, we have 1-I(A) = 0 and N(A)  = O. A 
proposition is neutral when its truth value is undetermined. We can say that its 
truth belongs to {0, 1}: v(A) E {0, 1}. We have I I (A) = 1 and l I (~A)  = 1, 
which also means that N(A)  = 0. As can be seen, whenever the measure of 
possibility and necessity are equal, a single truth value is defined. On the other 
hand, a unique truth value cannot be defined when modalities differ. A neutral 
proposition A only leads us to say that it is as possible that A is true as it is that A 
is false. 
When propositions are fuzzy, Zadeh defines the truth value by the equality 
I~A(X) = rA(X) = v(X E A) (22) 
The degree of membership ofa singleton x in the set A, #~ (x), equals the degree 
of truth of the proposition "x  is A . "  We can extend this definition by estimating 
the degree of truth of the proposition "X  is A , "  knowing that the proposition 
"X  is B"  is true. The information "X  is B"  does not necessarily induce a 
unique truth value for the proposition "X  is A . "  Nevertheless, upper and lower 
truth values can be estimated. 
TrmOREM 11 The upper truth value v*(A I B) is given by 
v*(A IB)= Sup ® (rA(x), lrn(x)) (23) 
xEfl 
where ~ stands for a T-norm. 
Proof Knowing that "X  is B"  is true, we can estimate the truth of 
proposition A, v (A I B), when A is a crisp set. First, we translate "X  is A"  into 
vx E fl: Px = "X  is x"  = "X  is A"  = Max Px 
xEA 
Therefore, since rn(x)  = #n(x) = V(px), we have 
VA E ~: v(AlB)=Maxrn(x ) xeA 
We can extend this definition to a fuzzy set A by Zadeh's extension principle: 
v*(A I B )=Sup ® (~'A(x), 7rB(x)) 
xEfl  
where ® stands for a T-norm. [] 
DEFINrrIoN 4 The upper solution for the truth of A equals the 
complement of the lower solution for the truth of -~A. 
o*(A) = 1 - v.(-~ A)  
COROLLARY The lower truth value v,(A IB) is given by 
v,(A I B) = 1 - Sup ® (1 - ~rA (x), rn(x)) (24) 
xEII 
where ® stands for a T-norm. 
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Given (4) and (5), it is obvious that 
o*(A I B) = H(A I B) (25) 
v*(A [B) = N(A  I B) (26) 
So the upper solution is the possibility to have A true knowing that B is true. By 
duality, the lower solution is the corresponding necessity measure. 
THEOREM 12 The degree of  truth of  a proposition A knowing that a 
proposition B is true always belongs to the bounded interval [N (A I B), FI 
(.4 IB)J, an interval where all degrees of  truth are equally possible. One 
has 
v(A) E [N(A [B), II(A IB)] (27) 
Note the particular place of partial truth values in our definition of epistemic 
uncertainty. This epistemic uncertainty only deals with necessity and possibility 
measures and their particular form: the upper and lower truth values. By duality, 
the same trend can be found in "classical" uncertainty theory (we called it 
supra-epistemic uncertainty) for the upper and lower probabilities. Magrez has 
developed this observation and the relations between these two kinds of 
uncertainty in Ref. 16. 
Example 6 The truth status of the proposition A: "Paul is young" can be 
estimated from the information B: "Paul's age is around 24, 25." We have 
previously found (Example 3) that N(A[B)  = .67 and H(AIB) = .73. 
Therefore, the truth of the proposition "Paul is young" knowing that "Paul's 
age is around 24, 25" belongs to the interval [.67, .73]. 
Parent Distribution Induced by a Partial Truth 
We would like to be able to infer an unknown proposition B from a partial 
information based on a proposition qualified by a partial truth value: 
o(A IB)=a, where B is unknown 
It can be seen that, the only way to get a unique truth value is the case where 
necessity and possibility measures both equal that value, and we can state that 
N[A [B] = a and II[A I B] = 8. Because of this close connection between the 
truth and the necessity and possibility measures, the upper and lower solutions 
for the unknown proposition B should be easily estimated. 
The Upper Solution 
THEOREM 13 The largest distribution B* for the parent distribution 
induced by v (A) = 0 is 
VX E •: ~rB*(X)=(rA(X)+ I--O)) A (I--~'A(X)+0) (28) 
Proof The proof directly follows (15). [] 
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The Lower Solution 
THEOREM 14 The strongest distribution B ,  that could be inferred from 
o(A) = a is 
E 12: ~rB,(x)= I 1 if~'A(X)=a VX 0 otherwise (29) 
Proof The proof directly follows (16). [] 
As we have previously seen, the lower solutions for the distribution B.  
induced by "N(A)  = a,"  Eq. (12), and "I I(A) = a,"  Eq. (14), are strictly 
equivalent. 
The lower solution depends on the fuzzy or crisp character of the set defined 
by proposition A and on its shape: 
1. A is a fuzzy set: The solution will be I, 2, or n singletons, according to the 
shape of A (cf. Note 3). 
2. A is a crisp set: 
• If a belongs to the interval ]0, 1 [, no solution exists for distribution B. 
This observation satisfies common sense. In fact, if proposition A is 
crisp and proposition B corresponds to a singleton, there can be only 
total agreement or total disagreement between them. No shade is 
allowed. 
• I fa = 1, then B can be any singleton in the domain ofA. Conversely, if
a = 0, then B can be any singleton in the domain of -',A. 
Example 7 Let the truth of a proposition A: "Paul's age is around 24, 25" 
equal .8. The upper solution for a parent distribution is given by 
Vx E 12: rB.(X)=(~rA(X)+.2)) ^ (1--rA(X)+.8) 
The lower solution is the two singletons {23.2, 25.8}: 
I1  if ~rA(x) = .8 
VX E 12: ~rB.(X)= 0 otherwise 
Properties of the Truth Measures 
TrmogEM 15 Let X and Y be two noninteractive ariables that take their 
values on fll and 122, respectively. Let two in formations "'v(P) = O'" and 
"'v(Q) = f '"  be transformed in two necessarily true fuzzy sets, let us say 
P' and Q', by the use of(28) and (29). Then the following equalities hold 
for upper and lower solutions: 
v(P Or Q IP' & Q') = Max(0, f )  
v(P & QIP'  & Q')=Min(O, f )  
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Proof The proof follows immediately from the property of truth-functional- 
ity. We have 
N(P  Or QIP" & Q' )=I I (P  Or QIP" & Q')=Max(#, f )  
and 
N(P  & QIP '  & Q' )=I I (P  & QIP '  & Q')=Min(0, f )  
These equalities are verified, and therefore our approach keeps intact the 
fundamental property of multivalent logics. [] 
TrmoP~u 16 The following equalities hold: 
la. v.(P & Q) = v.(P) A v.(Q), which means N(P  & Q) = N(P)  ^ 
N(Q)  
lb. v*(P & Q) = v*(P) A v*(Q), which means II(P & Q) = l-l(P) ^  II 
eQ) 
2a. v,(P OR Q) = v.(P) v v.(Q), which means N(P  OR Q) = N(P)  v 
N(Q)  
2h. v*(P OR Q) = v*(P) v o*(QA which means II(P OR Q) = II(P) v H 
CO) 
Properties la and 2b have already been proved (Theorems 9 and 10): 
N(P  & Q)=N(P)  A N(Q)  I I(P OR Q)=I I (P)  v II(Q) 
Therefore, we only have to prove N(P  Or Q) = N(P)  v N(Q)  and II(P & Q) 
= II(P) A H(Q) to see the truth-functionality verified. 
Proof 
H(P & QIP'  & Q')=Sup[(~rp(x) A 7rQ(y)).AND.(~rp,(x) A 7rQ,(y))] 
xy 
By the use of (12), we obtain 
Sup(Tm(rl,(x), ~rp,(x)) A Tm(lrQ(y), 7rO,(y))). 
xy 
Given the distributivity between the Min and Max operators, the following 
equality holds: 
Sup Tm(Trp(x), 7r/,, (x)) A Sup Tm(Tro(y), ~rO, (y)) 
x y 
and therefore n(PIP')  ^  n(Ol O'). 
The same resolution holds for the lower solution: N(P  OR QIP' & Q') 
equals 1 - H(~P& -~QI P '  & Q'), which equals 1 - [H(-~PI P ' )  A H 
("1 Q I Q')] by the use of the previous proof. Given the relation between 
necessity and possibility, one obtains N(P IP ' )  v N(QI Q'). 
Relation lb is proved identically thanks to the dual relation between lb and 
2a. [] 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The estimation of a necessity (a possibility) measure always depends on the 
knowledge base that represents our reality's feeling. This knowledge is 
represented by a collection of propositions, precise or vague but, in this paper, 
never uncertain in the sense of ignorance or doubt. These propositions are true, 
and even necessarily true. On the basis of the knowledge base, we are able to 
estimate the modalities of other propositions. Moreover, we can estimate these 
modalities on the basis of partially necessary or possibly true propositions in an 
epistemic understanding. In order to do this, we have designed a tool to 
transform a proposition qualified by a partial degree of necessity (possibility) 
into a fuzzier, but necessarily true, proposition. Thanks to the possibilistic 
interpretation of the membership function, a transformation between impreci- 
sion and uncertainty appeared. These transformations preserve the fundamental 
properties of the necessity and possibility measures. These transformation tools 
can be used widely for the query of imprecise knowledge bases, and also for 
fuzzy inference (Magrez [25]). 
The partial truth values are integrated in this theory of necessity and 
possibility. The truth of a proposition is understood as its degree of conformity 
with the reality we know. We show that the truth degree of a proposition 
estimated from an imprecise information is not necessary unique and belongs to 
an interval. The lower bound is a necessity measure, and the upper bound is a 
possibility measure. Therefore formal theory of multiple-valued truths finds a 
semantic interpretation i this integrated theory of epistemic uncertainty and 
imprecision. The same transformation tools between partially true propositions 
and certainly true (but fuzzier) propositions were designed. These tools did not 
violate the truth functionality property. 
We hope that these tools will be helpful in the field of fuzzy expert systems. 
APPENDIX: TRIANGULAR NORMS 
The concept of T-norms and S-norms is fully developed by Schweizer and 
Sklar [19-21] and Weber [22]. 
DEFINrrIoN A1 A T-norm is a function ~ from [0, 1] x [0, 1] to [0, 1] 
such that for all a, b, c, d E [0, 1], one has 
1. ®(a, b) = ®(b, a) 
2. ®(a, ®(b, c)) = ®(®(a, b), c) 
3. ®(a, b) >_ ®(c, d ) i fa  > c and b >_ d 
4. ®(a ,  1) = a 
A T-norm is called Archimedian iff 
5. ® is continuous 
symmetry 
associativity 
monotony 
boundary conditions 
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6. ®(a, a) < a 
An Archimedian T-norm is said to be strict i f f  
7. ~ is strictly increasing in each of  its places. 
We remark that 7 implies 6. 
Examples 
Min(a, b) 
The product : a.b 
Tin(a, b)=Max(0, a+ b-  1) 
I 
a~, if b = 1 
Tw(a, b) = if a = 1 
otherwise 
For any T-norm ®, one has Tw(a, b) < ®(a, b) _ Min(a, b). 
DFFiNrrior~ A2 A T-conorm is a function • from [0, 1] × [0, 1] to [0, 
1] (Archimedian or strict) i f f  • has the same properties as a T-norm 
with the modifications 
4'. ~(a ,O)=a 
6'. • (a, a) > a 
Examples 
Max(a, b) 
The probabilistic sum a + b - a.b 
The bounded sum Min(1, a+b) 
I abl, if b = 0 Tw(a, b)= if a=O 
otherwise 
For any T-conorm ~,  one has T*(a, b) > • (a, b) >_ Max(a, b) 
DE~aNrrxoN A3 A function n: [0, 1] ~ [0, 1] is called a negation 
(function) i f f  
1. n(O) = 1, n(l) = 0 
2. n(a) <_ n(b) i f  a >_ b monotonicity 
A negation is strong i f f  
3. n(a) < n(b) i f  a > b strict monotonicity 
4. n is continuous 
A strong negation is an involution i f f  
5. n (n (a)) = a for all a E lO, 11 
For any negation, 5 implies 3. 
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To any T-norm @ and a strict negation is associated a T-conorm defined as 
®(a, b) = n(®(n(a), n(b))) 
is called the n-dual of ®. 
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